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The main task of international courts usually lies with applying the
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conserved in given norms. International courts and the outward show of
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law, cannot render judgment sub specie legis ferendae, or anticipate the
law before the legislator has laid it down.”1 In its Nuclear Weapons
advisory opinion, the ICJ reiterated that it “cannot legislate, and, in the
circumstances of the present case, it is not called upon to do so. Rather,
its task is to engage in its normal judicial function of ascertaining the
existence of legal principles and rules applicable to the threat or use of
nuclear weapons.”2 Further examples abound, also from other
international judicial institutions.3 Even if the metaphorical report of
judges as the bouche de la loi no longer directs—if it ever did—the
thought on what judges actually do, the understanding is still ubiquitous
that judges find and give voice to the applicable law in individual cases
by examining the relevant norms in the context of the legal system.
Interpretation looks like an act of discovering meanings and of
uncovering the law, very much like an exercise in archaeology. At the
same time, it is not at all uncommon to see that international courts not
only interpret the law in this sense but also develop the law in their
practice. As a matter of fact, for many key protagonists, like Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht, developing the law was actually the ICJ’s “essential
function.”4 During the First World War, Hans Wehberg, another
influential voice in international legal scholarship at the time, also
emphatically pled that international law be developed by way of more
international adjudicatory practice.5
Upon closer inspection, however, the concept of development
starts to blur.6 It seems to suggest the creation of something new, or at

1. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 53 (July 25).
2. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
¶ 18 (July 8).
3. See, e.g., Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, at 8 (Mar. 3); Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 11, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WTDS11/AB/R (Oct. 4,
1996) [hereinafter Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report].
4. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 42 (1958) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT] (arguing that it is
the court’s “essential function . . . to contribute by its decisions to the development of
international law”). Cf. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 249 (1933).
5. HANS WEHBERG, THE PROBLEM OF AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 11, 55
(1918) (explicitly exclaiming that the solution is “[a] further development of international law
through international decisions!”).
6. See Georges Abi-Saab, De la jurisprudence: Quelques réflexions sur son rôle dans le
développement du droit international, in HACIA UN NUEVO ORDEN INTERNACIONAL Y EUROPEO
19, 25 (1993) (suggesting that the role of case law in the development of public international law
is the archetypical case of a claire-obscure subject).
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the very least, an addition to that which already exists.7 But in this sense
the concept of development would challenge the idea that international
courts apply and do not make law. As such, it stands almost as an
antithesis to “proper” adjudication. Couched within the prevailing idea
about the main international judicial task, the concept of development
has overall lost its contours. Notably, Lauterpacht and Wehberg use
development interchangeably with clarification. In their arguments,
development means making law visible.8 This legacy resonates in more
recent writings just as well. Christopher Greenwood, for example,
writes about the development of international criminal law by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in
contradistinction to the making of new law, which is not part of the task
and function of the tribunal.9 On this account, in both their roles as
interpreters and developers of the law, international courts give voice to
the existing law—or, in Lauterpacht’s parlance, to the law that lies
behind the cases.10
Views on interpretation as discovery and development as
clarification have certainly not been without critique. These views do
not stand up to theoretical scrutiny and, to be sure, they are usually not
taken at face value. However, they are influential nonetheless. Legal
reasoning compels all actors to base their arguments on the law as it is;
everything else would defeat their claims from the outset. As Stanley
Fish puts it, “the very point of the legal enterprise requires that its
practitioners see continuity where others, with less of a stake in the
enterprise, might feel free to see change.”11 For international courts, it is
all the more important to portray their practice as firmly based on the
law as it stands because this is an important source of their legitimacy.
Whenever the impression gains currency that they are not engaged in
the proper business of applying the law given to them, they are usually
in trouble.

7. See Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Institutions as
Lawmakers, 12 GERMAN L.J. 979 (2011) (explaining that the concept of judicial lawmaking
would emphasize precisely this creative dimension of international adjudication).
8. See LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 42–43; see also WEHBERG, supra
note 5, at 11–12.
9. Christopher Greenwood, The Development of International Law by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 97, 111 (1998).
10. See LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 3–74 (discussing “The Law Behind
the Cases”).
11. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERATURE AND LEGAL STUDIES 157 (1989).
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The problem is that the outward show of legal reasoning—
depicting interpretation as discovery and development as clarification—
overburdens the language of law with aspirations it cannot meet. More
precisely, this reasoning suggests that legal rules contain within
themselves the yardsticks that separate correct from incorrect
applications of the law.12 Typically, interpretations should not fill the
law with that which it does not already contain, but should uncover
what is already there.13 The text should separate permissible from
impermissible interpretations.14 The myth that sustains this view is the
idea that legal provisions come with meanings attached to them. If one
had access to the underlying meaning, then the law could be found,
correct applications could be distinguished from incorrect readings, and
development could be distinguished from a mere statement of what the
law really is. Alas, this premise crumbles under a little closer reflection
and with a little distance from the legal enterprise.
The present article unfolds the central proposition of the linguistic
turn and contends that law only exists in its interpretative practice and is
not something ready to be discovered. The content of the law is shaped
in the creative acts of interpretation—its jurisgenerative practice.15 This
move first of all redirects attention toward the actors of interpretation.
Notably then, the argument continues that international courts generally
enjoy outstanding semantic authority. Their decisions weigh heavily in
disputes about what the law really means. At the same time, it is rather
evident that this authority in interpretation is not boundless, but
constrained. But how can the practice of international adjudication be
understood as both creative and constrained under the premise that law
does not have a meaning other than that contributed to it in its use?
With greater emphasis on what is at stake from a normative angle, the
question is who rules, the law or the courts? Working out these
questions will be the crux of the present article addressing the role of
international courts as interpreters and developers of the law.
This article will illustrate the persistently influential view
regarding the role of international courts that belittles their qualities as
12. J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 774 (1987).
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See id.
15. See generally INGO VENZKE, HOW INTERPRETATION MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ON SEMANTIC CHANGE AND NORMATIVE TWISTS (2012, forthcoming) [hereinafter VENZKE,
HOW INTERPRETATION MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW] (leaning on developments in linguistics
and developing a theoretical account of interpretation as a practice that is both creative and
constrained).
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actors in the making of international law. It summarizes why the
outward show of judicial argument eclipses this dimension of judicial
practice and then speaks on the metaphor of sources, and how it has
(mis)shaped accounts of international lawmaking (Part II). The third
part then takes a step back and asserts the proposition that it is
impossible to find meaning anywhere else other than in the concrete use
of legal provisions. It highlights how law comes to life in the practice of
interpretation and argues that this practice itself has to bear the burden
of distinguishing correct from incorrect applications of the law (Part
III). The next step first elucidates international courts’ semantic
authority by focusing on the mighty spell of judicial precedents in
international legal discourse and then turns to sketching the principal
normative implications (Part IV). Finally, the concluding prognosis
recommends paying closer regard to the qualities of international courts
as actors in the jurisgenerative practice of interpretation. It ends with the
suggestion to develop a better understanding of the role of international
courts in a normative pluriverse in which they interact with actors on
other levels of governance and negotiate spheres of authority (Part V).
II. MYTHS IN THE FIELD OF ADJUDICATION
A. The Field of Adjudication
International courts portray their practice as applying the law that
is given to them.16 In one of its very early Advisory Opinions the ICJ
exemplarily stated “it is a duty of the Court to interpret treaties, not to
revise them.”17 Other institutions have recurrently made similar
pronouncements in their case law. Court statutes also frequently testify
that applying the law, rather than revising it, is precisely what they are
supposed to do. The renowned Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
explicitly provides that the dispute settlement system serves “to clarify
the existing provisions of [the covered] agreements in accordance with

16. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Le juge et la règle générale, 93 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 569, 569 (1989); Maurice Kamto, La volonté de l’état en droit
international, 310 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 284 (2004); see generally LAURENCE BAUM, JUDGES
AND THEIR AUDIENCES (2006) (showing how courts cater to the expectations of their audience).
17. Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), Judgment
1952 I.C.J. 176, 196, 200, 206 (Aug. 27). See also Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Romania, Second Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 221, 229 (July 18).
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customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”18 It further
stresses that the recommendations and rulings of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) “cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements.”19 While it is reassuring
with regard to the nature of the main judicial task, this provision also
reflects an apprehension that reality frequently does not live up to the
tidiness of orthodox doctrine.20
The WTO Appellate Body (AB) has relied on Article 3.2 of the
DSU to corroborate the view that its reports do little more than give
voice to the law.21 Ever since its very first decision, US – Gasoline, the
court embraced the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law for its task, seeking the most solid ground for
ascertaining the law.22 In particular, in its early years, the AB sought to
augment its authority with uncertain success to the extent that its
practice has sharply been termed to portray a “textual fetish.”23 For
example, in the hard-fought and crucial report of the US – Shrimp case,
the AB criticized the panel for not having followed the international law
rules of interpretation and underscored that “[a] treaty interpreter must
begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be
interpreted.”24
While the hermeneutics of international courts differ, other bodies,
also renowned for their dynamism, are just as eager to sustain the view
of their practice as impeccable applications of the law. If there are
18. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 2, Art. 3.2, 33. I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
See also Jan Klabbers, On Rationalism in Politics: Interpretation of Treaties and the World
Trade Organization, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L LAW 405, 408 (2005).
19. Id. at 412.
20. Id. at 412–13.
21. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, at 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Appellate
Body Report]; Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 10.
22. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 21, at 17; Alcoholic Beverages Appellate
Body Report, supra note 3, at 10.
23. See Douglas A. Irwin & Joseph H.H. Weiler, Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS 285), 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 71, 89–95 (2008). Cf.
Georges Abi-Saab, The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 453, 461 (Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan
Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., 2006) (suggesting with less of an edge that the emphasis on the
text in interpretation might be too much). See generally ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY
INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY 106 (2009) (discussing the patterns in the
Appellate Body’s interpretative practice more generally).
24. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
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changes in the law without anything that could sensibly be termed
legislation, they have come about outside the practice of the court.
Courts only make what has already happened visible. The European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), for instance, is known for its method
of evolutive interpretation and its characterization of the European
Convention of Human Rights (Convention) as a living instrument.25
With this notion, the ECtHR recognizes that the law changes through
societal processes even where the Convention it applies has not been
amended to reflect those processes. However, in the same breath with
which the ECtHR pronounces a dynamic interpretation, it usually voices
limits to this method by habitually reiterating that it cannot create new
law or add rights to the Convention that it does not already contain.26
International courts have an interest in sustaining the view that
they simply apply existing law because the view nourishes the main
source of their authority. They purport to respect the parties’ consent to
international adjudication and deny any agency.27 Legal reasoning is
critical to this effect. Hersch Lauterpacht and Hans Wehberg saw the
development and clarification of the law as the most important
international judicial function, precisely because only if the law were
sufficiently clear and predictable would states submit to international
adjudication.28 International courts would unleash the potential of the
pacifying language of the law, which builds exactly on its distance from
the muddy business of politics and diplomacy.29 Elihu Root, one of
President Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretaries of State and a key figure at
the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, expressed this unrelenting
25. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. A 26 ¶ 31 (1978). Among
the more recent cases in this regard, see Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03, ¶ 63 (Oct. 27,
2009); Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), 2009-17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 104; Emonet and others v. Switzerland,
49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, ¶¶ 66, 83 (2007). Cf. Rudolf Bernhardt, Evolutive Treaty Interpretation of
the European Convention on Human Rights, 42 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 11 (1999).
26. E.g., Johnston v. Ireland, App. No. 9697/82, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 53 (Dec. 18,
1986) (“[T]he Court cannot, by means of an evolutive interpretation, derive from these
instruments a right that was not included therein at the outset. This is particularly so here, where
the omission was deliberate.”).
27. See, e.g., Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928
P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 15, at 22 (Apr. 26); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1948 I.C.J. 15, at 27 (Mar.
25); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1984 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 34 (Mar. 21); East Timor
(Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, at 101 (June 30); see also Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from
Consensual to Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of
Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 816–29 (2007) (suggesting a paradigm shift from
consensual to compulsory jurisdiction, with notable exceptions for the ICJ and IACHR).
28. LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 42.
29. See WEHBERG, supra note 5, at 55.
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advocacy for a strong international judiciary when he eloquently and
emphatically argued: “What we need for the future development of
arbitration is the substitution of judicial action for diplomatic action, the
substitution of judicial sense of responsibility for diplomatic sense of
responsibility.”30
Whenever it is more than sporadically disputed that courts do
something other than apply the law given to them, the courts are usually
in trouble. Their response to finding themselves in this kind of trouble is
to try even harder to portray their practice as impeccable rulefollowing.31 Psychologist Dan Simon persuasively argues that no matter
how plagued with doubt and uncertainty the process of coming to a
decision may have been, judges would still present the outcome as the
only possible solution and all alternatives as next to absurd.32 It is
precisely this legitimacy angst that leads to rather apodictic reasoning,
even though this may not be the best long-term strategy. However, not
only outside pressure and outside expectations hold international judges
to the outward show of legal argument; their ethos and genuine
conviction may also push them towards embracing their activity as one
of finding the law to be applied to the facts in front of them.33
Moreover, the juridical language itself contributes to the image of
impersonality and objectivity. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has remarked
that the law’s language contains both a neutralization and
universalization effect.34 He claims that this is “[f]ar from being a
simple ideological mask,” but rather, “the basis of a real autonomy of
thought and practice, the expression of the whole operation of the
juridical field.”35 It is an attitude much more than a mask for domination
or for the cunning exercise of power, he suggests.36 The ICJ expresses
this thought clearly when it maintains that “[l]aw exists . . . to serve a

30. Id. (quoting Elihu Root).
31. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 12–13 (1964).
See also BAUM, supra note 16, at 25–49 (discussing how judges manage their own appearance in
view of considerations of social legitimacy).
32. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1,
19–22 (1998). Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of
Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 48, 53 (1949) (“[I]t is
elegant—and it inspires confidence—to give the garb of an established rule of interpretation to a
conclusion reached as to the meaning . . . of a treaty.”).
33. SHKLAR, supra note 31, at 12.
34. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 814, 820 (1987).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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social need; . . . precisely for that reason it can do so only through and
within the limits of its own discipline. Otherwise, it is not a legal service
that would be rendered.”37 Drawing on the Weberian study of the
legitimating effect of rationalization, Bourdieu finally contends that
[t]he ritual that is designed to intensify the authority of the act of
interpretation . . . adds to the collective work of sublimation designed
to attest that the decision expresses not the will or the world-view of
the judge but the will of the law or the legislature (voluntas legis or
38
legislatoris).

In short, the outward show of legal argument is part and parcel of
the social legitimacy in the field of adjudication. It also generally
responds to expectations of other participants in legal discourse and has
the aptitude to constrain and allow for critique. Argumentative
standards in legal discourse harbor a potential to contribute to the
normative legitimation of international adjudication.39 There is thus little
purchase in suggesting that judges are liars when they portray their
practice as one of finding the law that is given to them.40 It is
problematic, however, if the outward show of legal practice directs our
thinking on what really happens.
B. The Metaphor of Sources
Two ideas are complicit in misdirecting our thought on the role of
international courts in interpreting and developing the law: thinking of
lawmaking in terms of sources, and thinking of interpretation as
uncovering what is already out there. Both these ideas are myths, not in
the strong sense of the word that sometimes carries a subtle and
possibly stingy accusation of naïveté, but in the sense of assumptions
that are so deeply embedded in prevailing narratives of what happens

37. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 49 (July 18). The
case is a textbook example of how such a retreat to a narrow, if not poor, version of legal
positivism masks very clear and palpable political choices. See Edward McWhinney, Judicial
Settlement of Disputes: Jurisdiction and Justiciability, 221 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 36–46 (1990).
38. Bourdieu, supra note 34, at 828.
39. See infra Part IV.A. In closer detail, see Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the
Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1341, 1344
(2011) [hereinafter Bogdandy & Venzke, Democratic Legitimation].
40. See generally Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155 (1994).
At best it may point to precisely this paradox. See Ralph Christensen, Die Paradoxie richterlicher
Gesetzesbindung, in RECHT VERHANDELN. ARGUMENTIEREN, BEGRÜNDEN UND ENTSCHEIDEN
IM DISKURS DES RECHTS 1, 4–7 (Kent D. Lerch ed., 2005).
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that they are not questioned.41 Making those assumptions evident and
subject to critique is the purpose of this section.
The idea that international courts can confine themselves to
applying the law hinges on the notion that the law is made by someone
else. In international law, the argument goes, the law is made in ways
that are recognized by the doctrine of sources. Thinking of international
lawmaking in terms of sources can be traced back to the heyday of
classic liberalism in international law when domestic contractual
theories were projected onto the international level.42 As a bottom line,
legitimacy rests on consent and each of the individual sources listed in
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute pretends to be a manifestation of such
consent by the states.43
A quick run-through of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute shows that
treaty law most straightforwardly credits state consent.44 The source of
international custom gives rise to more protracted difficulties, but the
understanding here also prevails that the formation of customary
international law holds state practice and opinio juris to be decisive
precisely because they are manifestations of state consent.45 A look at
41. On such an understanding of myths and their production in societal processes, see
generally ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (1972).
42. See Gerry Simpson, Imagined Consent: Democratic Liberalism in International Legal
Theory, 15 AUSTL. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 103, 103 (1994); JULIUS GOEBEL, THE EQUALITY OF
STATES: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LAW 34 (1925). Cf. Paul Guggenheim, Contribution à
l’histoire des sources du droit des gens, 4 RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 20–35 (1958) (arguing that the
need for a sophisticated positive doctrine of sources increased while natural law thinking receded
into the background).
43. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993. See also GODEFRIDUS J.J. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 76–82 (1983).
44. See Karin Oellers-Frahm, The Evolving Role of Treaties in International Law, in
PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 173, 176–79 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca Bratspies eds.,
2008); see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 16–32, 94–121 (2d ed.
2007). This proposition holds even if there are by now many odd cases and noteworthy
tendencies to curtail the consent requirement in amendment procedures. For instance, see JAN
KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15–36 (1996); DEVELOPMENTS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2005);
Malagosia A. Fitzmaurice, Modifications to the Principle of Consent in Relation to Certain
Treaty Obligations, 2 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 275, 280–82 (1997) (detailing the aspects
of consent within environmental treaty regimes).
45. Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed. 2006); Alain Pellet, Article 38, in STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 677, 749–59 (Andreas Zimmermann,
Christian Tomuschat & Karin Oellers-Frahm eds., 2006) (explaining in detail the definition of
custom in international law); Peter Haggenmacher, La doctrine des deux élements du droit
coutumier dans la practique de la cour internationale, 90 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5, 6–7 (1986). On the quaint understanding of customary law as a form
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the use of general principles, however, may turn out to be most
dizzying.46 Oftentimes, general principles are closely intertwined with
such notions as equity that are usually not themselves taken as sources
of the law, but as guiding yardsticks on the level of interpretation, or as
rescue kits when gaps in the law need to be filled.47 Jurisprudence has
been both unproductive and ambiguous in this regard.48 The ICJ once
famously spoke of “general and well-recognized principles [such as]
elementary considerations of humanity.”49 But on a later occasion the
ICJ reasserted its decidedly legalistic ethos arguing that
[i]t is a court of law, and can take account of moral principles only in
so far as these are given a sufficient expression in legal form . . . .
Humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational basis
for rules of law . . . . Such considerations do not, however, in
50
themselves amount to rules of law.

There is abundant treatment of the details of each source, its
elements, and its problems.51 It is also true that there is considerable flux
and significant developments in the understanding of sources.52 The

of tacit agreement, see Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272
RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 264 (1998).
46. Martti Koskenniemi, General Principles: Reflexions on Constructivist Thinking in
International Law, 18 Oikeustiede-Jurisprudentia [Yearbook of the Finnish Law Society] 120,
125 (1985). Cf. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 99–100 (1988) (arguing that more
lenient approaches to the formation of customary law are better treated in terms of general
principles).
47. ULRICH FASTENRATH, LÜCKEN IM VÖLKERRECHT: ZU RECHTSCHARAKTER, QUELLEN,
SYSTEMZUSAMMENHANG, METHODENLEHRE UND FUNKTIONEN DES VOLKERRECHTS 127–34
(1991); Michael Akehurst, Equity and General Principles of Law, 25 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 801,
801 (1976).
48. The field of international criminal law might count as an exception. See Fabián O.
Raimondo, General Principles of Law, Judicial Creativity and the Development of International
Criminal Law, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 45, 46
(Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 2010).
49. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). Cf. Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), (Judgment) 1986, I.C.J. 14,
¶ 218 (June 27) (speaking of “fundamental principles of humanitarian law” and referring to its
dictum in Corfu Channel). See also Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment,
¶ 183 (Dec. 10, 1998).
50. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966,
I.C.J. 6, ¶ 49 (July 18).
51. See, e.g., Abi-Saab, supra note 6, at 19, 25–26; Pellet, supra note 45, at 749–59; VAN
HOOF, supra note 43, at 76–81; MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 360–65 (2005).
52. See Abi-Saab, supra note 6, at 19, 25–26; Pellet, supra note 45, at 749–59, 783–84; VAN
HOOF, supra note 43, at 76–81; KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 51, at 360–65.
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main contention here is that the concept of source will continue to
sustain the idea that acts and instruments that come under its heading
fill out all the space where the law is made. In this vein, Article 38(1)(d)
of the ICJ Statute speaks of “judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists” as “subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.”53 It thus gives them a standing similar to
factors influencing the meaning of a legal norm. Judicial decisions are
not themselves considered sources, but means for identifying legal
norms—a source for recognizing the law (Rechtserkenntnisquelle) but
not a source of law (Rechtsquelle).54 It may well be suggested that this
distinction should be played down.55 In particular, the mighty spell of
precedents in legal discourse indicates that it is at least partially out of
sync with legal practice, which is the ultimate arbiter about what counts
as a source of law and what does not.56
The main issue to address here lies in the very concept of source
and its impact on our imagination. Sources picture lawmaking as a onetime act—ideally captured in the journalist’s snapshot of state
representatives signing an international treaty in festive environments.57
Legal doctrine seems to have been caught in this image very much in
the way Ludwig Wittgenstein described: “A picture held us captive.
And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”58 Similarly, the metaphor of
sources has helped to sustain an understanding of lawmaking that is
held prisoner in its confines, systematically pointing to a narrow
segment of reality while eclipsing the rest.59 This metaphor suggests that
legal norms spring from dark and hidden places into daylight and it
overshadows incremental lawmaking in processes of interpretation
where actors argue about what the law really means.

53. United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, Apr. 18, 1946.
54. Pellet, supra note 45, at 783–84.
55. Abi-Saab, supra note 6, at 26.
56. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–10, 120–28, 130 (1997). See also infra Part
IV.A on the spell of precedents.
57. See the photograph of Anwar al-Sadat, Jimmy Carter and Menachem Begin at the
signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979 that adorns the cover of AUST, supra note 44.
58. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 115 (1958).
59. On metaphor and perception, see Philipp Sarasin, Diskurstheorie und
Geschichtswissenschaft, in HANDBUCH SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE DISKURSANALYSE 53, 68–
69 (Reiner Keller et al. eds., 2006); Marga Reiner & Elisabeth Camp, Metaphor, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 845, 845 (Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith eds.,
2006).
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C. The Semantics of Interpretation
The second myth partially responsible for misdirecting our
thinking about the practice of international courts is that interpretation
uncovers the law already out there, hidden in or behind the rules to be
applied.60 There is a difficulty here that stems from the fact that views
on interpretation tend very much to be shaped by asking how
interpreters should interpret and by amassing accounts of what
interpreters themselves say about their acts of interpretation. The rules
of interpretation then say what interpretation is. With regard to treaties,
these rules are spelled out in Article 31 in paragraph 1 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), providing that “[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.”61 The nuanced debates by the
International Law Commission (ILC) on this article remain
tremendously intriguing regarding the differing views on the definition
of interpretation.62
According to Sir Humphrey Waldock, one of the ILC’s special
rapporteurs on this topic, any interpreter should quite naturally first look
at a treaty’s wording.63 The text of a treaty “must be presumed to be the
authentic expression of the intentions of the parties.”64 An interpreter
should turn to the text as a proxy for finding that to which the parties
have consented. In its early years, the ICJ has held that “the first duty of
a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply provisions of a
treaty, is to endeavor to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary
meaning in the context in which they occur.”65 The ICJ has on occasion
reasserted that “[i]nterpretation must be based above all upon the text of

60. Cf. Andrea Bianchi, Textual Interpretation and (International) Law Reading: The Myth
of (In)Determinacy and the Genealogy of Meaning, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORK IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 34, 48–49 (Pieter H.F. Bekker et al. eds., 2010).
61. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
62. See Bianchi, supra note 60, at 36; see generally VENZKE, HOW INTERPRETATION
MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15 (reading the debates at the ILC trough the lens of a
quest for certainty).
63. Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, at 56,
Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/167 (July 7, 1964) (by Sir Humphrey Waldock).
64. Id.
65. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, at 8 (Mar. 3).
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the treaty.”66 The AB also found that Article 31 of the VCLT “provides
that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive
process.”67 The words should provide stable ground for international
adjudication. Legal doctrine and scholarship continue to uphold the
assumption that the text itself could distinguish permissible from
impermissible interpretations, firmly assigning interpretation its place
within the confines of what is permissible by the text of the norm.68
But what happens when the meaning of the text is contested? The
work of international courts usually sets in precisely when disputing
parties make diverging claims about what the law means.69 On a
preliminary note, it may help to clarify that sometimes a case may of
course, above all, revolve around questions of fact. The decisive issue
may thus be finding out what really happened.70 This may then involve
little disagreement about law. But, as soon as the question is raised as to
whether certain facts can really come within the ambit of a provision—
whether, for example, something really amounted to an armed attack
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter—then this question
becomes one of competing claims about what such a provision really
means. The wording itself can then in all probability not provide a
convincing answer to the dispute. It provides the battleground for
semantic struggles but it does not provide the answer for their
resolution.71
The task of interpretation would then be to carve out the real
meaning of the text—its true sense, as it were. Article 31 of the VCLT
thus continues that the ordinary meaning should be given to the terms of
66. Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 41 (Apr.
3); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.),
1995 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 33 (Feb. 15).
67. Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 11. The Appellate Body
continued to cite the ICJ with the proposition that “interpretation must be based above all upon the
text of the treaty.” Territorial Dispute, 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 41.
68. See, in an exemplary fashion, RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 87
(2008). In closer detail, see ROBERT KOLB, INTERPRÉTATION ET CRÉATION DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL: ESQUISSE D’UNE HERMÉNEUTIQUE JURIDIQUE MODERNE POUR LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 412–13 (2006) (setting out to develop a fresh look at doctrine by
drawing on studies in hermeneutics and arguing that interpreters must not fill the text with
anything that it does not already contain).
69. Bourdieu, supra note 34, at 818.
70. It is another question whether international courts are really well-equipped or even
willing to whole-heartedly engage in this task.
71. Ralph Christensen & Michael Sokolowski, Recht als Einsatz im semantischen Kampf, in
SEMANTISCHE KÄMPFE: MACHT UND SPRACHE IN DEN WISSENSCHAFTEN 353, 353 (Ekkehard
Felder ed., 2006). Cf. Bourdieu, supra note 34, at 818 (suggesting that “control of the legal text is
the prize to be won in interpretative struggles”).
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a treaty “in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”72
Not the naked word itself, but its meaning in the totality of its context
would then provide certainty about how a treaty needs to be
interpreted.73 Interpretation would then be about finding real meaning in
a holistic view of the words to be interpreted by looking at their
proximity in the text and at what the words aspire to do.
Some protagonists in the ILC pointed out that this method of
finding out the real meaning of the text would ultimately be futile
because it would actually introduce more uncertain elements into the
process of interpretation. Rather than look at interpretation, these
protagonists prefer to look to the force that makes the treaty—the will
behind the text. Hersch Lauterpacht, for example, vehemently argued
that looking at the text without determining the will of the parties would
be as bad as engaging in a kind of Begriffsjurisprudenz of the worst
kind.74 He continued to argue that something so mysterious as an
ordinary meaning should most certainly not be decisive.75 Importance
should rather be placed on the travaux préparatoires as a fundamental,
possibly the most important, element in treaty interpretation. Isolating
the text from the intentions of its drafters is simply not permitted in his
view.76 On this account, interpretation would be about finding the will
of the parties as a yardstick for determining what the law really means.77
There are a number of evident problems with reaching through the
text and analyzing the force behind it. On the fragile assumption that the
drafting process was neatly documented and readily available, even in
good faith, it is frequently impossible to find a uniform intention of the
drafters.78 Anything found in the negotiating records would also be in
need of interpretation and resorting to the force behind the treaty, with
all the methodological challenges this would involve, might ultimately
render the law to be rather outdated.
It is neither necessary nor possible to resolve these difficulties
here. Canvassing the different views on how to interpret in a

72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 61, art. 31(1).
73. Id.
74. Hersch Lauterpacht, De l’interpretation des traités: Rapport, 43 ANNUAIRE DE
L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 366, 389, 397 (1950).
75. Id. at 380.
76. Id. at 389. Cf. Jan Klabbers, International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of
Travaux Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?, 50 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 267, 277 (2003).
77. Klabbers, supra note 76, at 278.
78. Philip Allott, The Concept of International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 31, 43 (1999).
(drastically suggesting that “[a] treaty is a disagreement reduced to writing”).
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rudimentary fashion rather serves the purpose of highlighting what
interpretation is thought to be about: finding a treaty’s meaning in
whatever way it might be done best, by looking closely at the words
themselves, their context, or the force behind them. Views on this
matter differ among individuals and institutions, shaped by a number of
factors including education, institutional culture, and general outlooks
on the legitimatory basis or nature of international law.79 With regard to
the last factor, it is interesting to see that over the past decades there
may have been a subtle shift in understandings of interpretation that
tends to detract from strong emphases on the will of parties.80
Interpretative practice, in some fields like human rights protection and
international criminal law in particular, increasingly invokes notions of
fundamental values or community interests, possibly indicative of a
deeper structural transformation of international society that influences
understandings of interpretation.81
Interpretation may then not only be about finding what the parties
wanted, but also what interests the community, what is required by
human rights, or what is morally the best answer.82 Any of these
approaches tends to share the assumption—this merits emphasis—that
interpreters find something that is already out there: the parties’ will,
the community’s interest, human rights’ imperatives, or morality’s best
answer. In case of dispute about what the law means, international
courts seek stable ground to portray their practice as based on
something that already exists. Turning this understanding on its head,
any of these targets of adjudication, and of legal interpretation more
generally, are the products of its own practice.

79. See Jochen von Bernstorff & Ingo Venzke, Ethos, Ethics and Morality in International
Relations, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Rüdiger Wolfrum
ed., 2010).
80. See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 76, at 270–72 (detailing various methods for interpreting
treaties).
81. Among the truly rich literature on such possible transformation, see Georges Abi-Saab,
Whither the International Community?, 9 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 248, 255 (1998); Bruno Simma,
From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 221,
233 (1994); ANDREAS L. PAULUS, DIE INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAFT IM VÖLKERRECHT:
EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES VÖLKERRECHTS IM ZEITALTER DER
GLOBALISIERUNG 97–115 (2001); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law—
Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 ZAÖRV 547, 552 (2004).
82. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179–200 (1982).
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III. THE JURISGENERATIVE PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATION
The concept of sources suggests that a rule is set in place at one
point in time and then applied at a later stage.83 The corollary
understanding of interpretation suggests that it is concerned with
uncovering the rule already set in place.84 Both these elements build on
the assumption that words come with a meaning that lies outside their
use. Semantic pragmatism, however, teaches that it is not possible to
find meaning anywhere else other than in the concrete use of words.85
Law is made in its communicative practice (Part III.A). What does this
mean for the international judicial function? It does not mean that
judicial interpretation is unbound or subject to the pure volition of the
interpreter. Adjudication rather unfolds against the stabilizing
background of an interpretative community. But how exactly is it
possible that adjudicators are constrained by the law that they
themselves make (Part III.B)? This is also a formidable challenge for
the idea of the rule of law that international courts are supposed to
promote. Who rules, the law or the courts?
A. Lawmaking in Communicative Practice
Legal provisions cannot talk. Nor can human rights, the interests of
the international community, or morality for that matter. These concepts
are talked about and gain meaning through the practice of interpretation.
In Ludwig Wittgenstein’s succinct formulation that would trigger the
linguistic turn, words do not have a meaning other than that given to
them by their use.86 Wittgenstein solemnly maintained that the best one
can do is to observe and find rules that describe the use of a rule.87 The
meaning of such rule, however, would again only be given by its use, so

83. Hugh Thirlway, Concepts, Principles, Rules and Analogies: International and
Municipal Legal Reasoning, 294 RECUEIL DES COURS 265, 320 (2002).
84. See Klabbers, supra note 76, at 270.
85. Wittgenstein, supra note 58, ¶ 43.
86. Id. Insightful and cunning on the notion of the linguistic turn, see Richard Rorty,
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Reification of Language, in 2 ESSAYS ON HEIDEGGER AND
OTHERS 1, 50 (Richard Rorty ed., 1991).
87. Wittgenstein, supra note 58, ¶ 46.
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that one is caught in an infinite regress.88 Only practice can help. In his
notes On Certainty, Wittgenstein writes pithily: “You must look at the
practice of language, then you will see it.”89 This idea holds true all the
same for (international) law.
The field of adjudication suggests that interpretation in law is a
statement of fact in the sense that it declares what the law is. Carrying
on Wittgenstein’s legacy, John Langshaw Austin showed persuasively
that “there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that
stating is performing an act.”90 To illustrate his argument, Austin coins
the concept of performative speech, by which he refers to
communicative utterances that change the world.91 The worn example is
the utterance of the words “I do,” which in the right context may create
the bond of marriage. In a sly move, Austin tries to come up with
distinctions that separate such creative performative speech acts from
simple constative acts like “this is an apple.”92 If an international court
only engaged in constative acts of the kind “this is what the law is,”
then it could withdraw from any charge of making the law in its
practice. Austin suggests, however, that this is simply not possible.93 He
ultimately comes to the conclusion that every attempt at distinguishing
performative from constative acts fails because it is impossible to
withhold from interpreting even simple objects like apples, let alone
complex ideas like the law.94 Austin thus lets this distinction collapse,
thereby adding on to the strand of thinking that follows from the
linguistic turn and its proposition that communicative practice shapes
meanings.95
Judicial interpretations that present themselves as declaring what
the law really is contribute to its creation. Austin, a colleague of H.L.A.
Hart at Oxford, wrote that “[o]f all people, jurists should be best aware
88. SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 24 (1982).
Kant’s work already offers an early account of infinite regress that concerns the application of
general norms to concrete facts. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 132–33, 171–
72, 177 (Norman Kemp Smith trans. 1929) (1781) (“If [general logic] sought to give general
instructions how we are to subsume under these rules, that is, to distinguish whether something
does or does not come under them, that could only be by means of another rule. This in turn, for
the very reason that it is a rule, again demands guidance from judgment.”).
89. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY ¶ 501 (1969).
90. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS: THE WILLIAM JAMES LECTURES
DELIVERED AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY IN 1955, 4, 139 (2d ed. 1976).
91. Id. at 138–39.
92. Id. at 140–41.
93. Id. at 141.
94. Id. at 142–43; FISH, supra note 11, at 488–91.
95. See AUSTIN, supra note 90, at 138–39.
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of the true sense of affairs . . . [y]et they succumb to their own timorous
fiction, that a statement of ‘the law’ is a statement of fact.”96 Quite the
contrary, a statement of the law forms part of lawmaking. This bears
repeating: it is impossible not to interpret the law, and only in its
practice does law come to life.97 Practice itself has to bear the burden of
completing the lawmaking process in concrete instances by interpreting
the relevant facts and legal materials. The law is not fixed in and at its
source; rather, it gains meaning and shape in its interpretation.
Only occasionally does this thought still raise eyebrows. Hans
Kelsen already formulated a similar argument almost a century ago
when he forcefully critiqued orthodox judicial methodology for wanting
to make believe that the act of interpretation is nothing but an act of
understanding and clarification, whereas it really depends on a choice,
an act of will.98 Kelsen maintained that acts of law-application are also
acts of law-creation and argued that in the individually disputed case the
law cannot be discovered but only created.99 His critique of
methodological orthodoxy led him in his late writings so far as to
conclude that there is “no imperative without an imperator.”100 Kelsen
had in effect pulled the rug from under traditional ideas of legal
subsumption. However, the dynamism he introduced into legal practice
seems to have stopped short of extending its considerations to the
underlying rule that is being applied. While on his account judicial
decisions do create norms in concrete cases, decisions appear to leave
the general and abstract underlying provisions on which they are based
untouched.
Other scholars have since gone further, but have encountered other
limitations. The architects of the New Haven School were, for example,
most outspoken about their disdain for thinking in terms of formal
sources. Myres McDougal found that international law should be
“regarded not as mere rules but as a whole process of authoritative

96. Id. at 4.
97. Cf. NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 256 (1993) (“Alles schriftlich
fixierte Recht ist mithin zu interpretierendes Recht. . . . Jeder aktuell geltende Text setzt sich der
Interpretation aus, ja ist Text nur im Kontext von Interpretation.”); Dworkin, supra note 82, at
179–200 (reaching the same conclusion from a different theoretical angle).
98. HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 95 (1934). On this point Kelsen draws heavily on
Adolf Merkl, Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz, 47 JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER 425 (1918).
99. Id. at 95.
100. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS 29 (Michael Hartley trans. 1991).
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decisions in the world arena.”101 Michael Reisman argued in his article,
International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, that scholarly
teachings and judgments had developed a myth—the myth that
international law could be found by looking at what Article 38 of the
ICJ Statute claims to be the sources of all law.102 He maintains that
international law rather emerges from the myriad of legal
communications that a plethora of actors utter every day.103 The main
problem with this theoretical strand is that it follows a purely
instrumental understanding of international law that places legal
interpretation in the service of given substantive goals. Legal practice
has nothing distinct from politics.104
More recent voices from New Haven have also developed the
theory of transnational legal processes that suggests analyzing the
dynamic and jurisgenerative interactions among a multitude of actors
rather than the formal sources of the law.105 However, this theory
remains oddly torn between an endeavor to explain compliance with a
given norm through transnational legal processes, on the one hand, and
the development of norms, on the other.106 The emphasis is, after all, on
the former element while the latter remains oblique.107
A quite similar picture of lawmaking in communicative processes
emerges in the theoretical framework of systems theory. Systems theory
pictures law as a system within society constituted by communications
that operate with reference to the binary code of legal versus illegal.108
Interestingly, understanding law as a system of legal communications
replaces answers to the question of legal validity that look at a norm’s
101. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 169, 170 (1960). See also
Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Consideration and the International Judicial Process, 17 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 58, 58 (1968).
102. W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication. The
Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101, 107 (1981).
103. Id.
104. This comes out most clearly in Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power, and
Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137, 157 (1954).
105. Hongju Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). It
borrows the concept of “jurisgenesis” from Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 194 (1983). Cf. Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE
J. INT’L L. 301, 301–305 (2007) (developing the idea of jurisgenerative practices but relating his
argument to ideas of global legal pluralism, thus focusing on the generation of new norms in
societal processes).
106. Hongju Harold Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 626–27
(1998).
107. Id. at 653–55.
108. LUHMANN, supra note 97, at 61.
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formal pedigree with the test of practice. Only communicative
operations can tell what the law is.109 Views from New Haven neglect
the intrinsic logic of legal practice by subjecting interpretation in law to
the logics of the political, economic, or cultural system. Conversely,
systems theory recognizes legal practice as a distinct enterprise, but
loses any adequate grasp on the actual interpretative acts performed by
living human beings.
The concept of practice can transcend this divide. While practice
has long been predominantly coined in strong structuralist (and mainly
Marxist) traditions, it has come to be increasingly used in a way that
includes elements of agency. Maurice Merleau-Ponty has brought life
into the concept of practice, describing practice as historically-situated
speaking, thinking, and acting.110 Pierre Bourdieu also picked up the
concept and developed his sociology with the notion of a praxeological
epistemology, seeking to overcome the divide between approaches
centered on structures and those focused on actors.111 In the
jurisgenerative practice of interpretation, international courts are alive
as actors, not unbound, but constrained in their behavior.
B. Objectivism, Subjectivism, and the Normative Force of Practice
The suggestion that international courts make law in the practice of
adjudication challenges the idea of the rule of law and questions the
concept of law even more fundamentally. In H.L.A. Hart’s words,
“[l]egal theory has in this matter a curious history; for it is apt either to
ignore or to exaggerate the indeterminacies of legal rules.”112 In order to
avoid yet another twist to this curious history, the concept of practice
mediates between unconstrained agency and determinative structures
that leave no room for the choice of actors.113 But how does it do so?
Hart writes that it is necessary to distinguish a core of settled meanings
from disputed meanings,114 which may offer stability. It seems,
109. Id. at 110 (“Der einzige Geltungstest liegt deshalb im Gelingen einer laufenden
Änderung des Geltungszustandes des Systems, im laufenden Anschluß von Operation an
Operation, in der Autopoiesis des Systems.”). Cf. HART, supra note 56, at 123–28.
110. See generally MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, ADVENTURES OF THE DIALECTIC (1973)
(contending that thought and politics are situated in intersubjectively instituted practice).
111. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice
trans., 1977) (arguing that theories that treat practice as a mechanical reaction should be rejected,
but the intention and significance of works can still be more than the conscious intentions of their
authors).
112. HART, supra note 56, at 130.
113. See id. at 129.
114. Id. at 120–28.

120

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 34:99

however, that stable meaning is the result of the absence of dispute.
While there is at times some plausibility to the recurrent argument that
there is no dispute because the norm is clear, the line of reasoning
should more often than not be turned into its exact opposite. Most of the
time norms are clear because there is no dispute. When it comes to
international adjudication, the norm is at least unclear enough that each
side can make an arguable claim for its position.
Judicial decisions then involve a choice between at least two
alternatives. The concept of decision itself already defies the idea that a
clear norm could be found.115 The suggestion that words do not have a
meaning other than that contributed to them by their use further adds to
the challenge. How is it possible to understand the practice of
adjudication as an activity that oscillates between the snares of
objectivism (the plain meaning of the text) and pure subjectivism
(subjecting the text to the pure volition of the reader)? In other words,
how is it possible that the law can constrain the interpreter if only the
practice of interpretation makes the law?
First of all, interpretation in law is limited by the fact that it needs
to be accepted as a legal interpretative claim. Rules of interpretation and
standards upheld by the legal profession prescribe how participants in
legal discourse have to craft their arguments.116 Interpretation in law is a
distinct enterprise whose particularity is upheld by a combination of
moral choice, beliefs, ethos, and habit. It has also been suggested that
interpreters need to convey their argument as based on the law as it
stands if they want to succeed in a way that is marked precisely by the
rules of interpretation.117 Ultimately, however, the rules of interpretation
are themselves nothing but rules and subject to the same fate of
interpretation. This first attempt thus begs the question of how the
practice of interpretation can be constrained by rules that are only the
produce of that same practice.

115. See Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 919, 961–67 (1990); LUHMANN, supra note 97, at 308; cf. Andreas FischerLescano & Ralph Christensen, Auctoritatis Interpositio. Die Dekonstruktion des Dezisionismus
durch die Systemtheorie, 44 DER STAAT 213, 213–42 (2005).
116. See Friedrich V. Kratochwil, How do Norms Matter?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
35, 47 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); Abi-Saab, supra note 6, at 25; cf. Jean-François Lévesque,
Traités de verre:
Réflexions sur l’interprétation, 19 REVUE QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 53, 53–64 (2006) (offering an illuminating reconstruction of the rules of
interpretation in view of developments in the theory of language).
117. See supra Part II.A.
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The more promising answer to this question can be found by
considering that interpretations need to be accepted by interlocutors
within an interpretative community.118 Assessments of whether a
decision of an international court was correct can only be part of the
practice of interpretation itself. In order to succeed, an interpretation of
a rule needs to connect to the past in a way that shapes future
applications.119 To illustrate this point, Robert Brandom, spear-heading
the discussion of these questions in the philosophy of language, resorts
to a case law model of communication in which “[t]he current judge is
held accountable to the tradition she inherits by the judges yet to
come.”120 Present international courts are constrained by considerations
of how their interpretations will be received. Notably, this constraint
will depend on how the courts connect to the past.121 In this sense, the
role of international courts in the development of the law is interstitial;
it stands between the past and the future.122 The law gains shape and
develops in this interpretation in which actors demand and give reasons
for or against a particular interpretation of a provision. Practice itself
generates and upholds the law—it contains the yardstick of what should
legally be and how a provision should be interpreted.
Brandom further draws attention to the fact that the authority of
speakers matters in this practice.123 An interpreter who has interpreted
correctly in the past has a certain credit.124 Further considerations of
social legitimacy may also come into play. Notably then, international
courts are recognized in the international legal system, almost by
118. See FISH, supra note 11, at 141–60 (on the concept of interpretative communities).
119. Robert Brandom, Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and
Administration in Hegel’s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms, 7 EUR. J.
PHIL. 164, 181 (1999).
120. Id. For a concise introduction and summary, see JASPER LIPTOW, REGEL UND
INTERPRETATION. EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR SOZIALEN STRUKTUR SPRACHLICHER PRAXIS 220–
26 (2004). See also Markus Winkler, Die normative Kraft des Praktischen, 64 JURISTENZEITUNG
821–29 (2009).
121. Brandom, supra note 120, at 181 (summarizing his thought when he writes that “[t]he
current judge is held accountable to the tradition she inherits by the judges yet to come”). See also
Ralph Christensen, Neo-Pragmatismus: Brandom, in NEUE THEORIEN DES RECHTS 239 (Sonja
Buckel, Ralph Christensen & Andreas Fischer-Lescano eds., 2009).
122. See the famous words of Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (“I recognize without hesitation that judges do
and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially . . .”).
123. See Brandom, supra note 119, at 180.
124. See ROBERT BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND
DISCURSIVE COMMITTMENT xiv (1998) (explaining that successful interpretations in the past
show on an actor’s “deontic scorekeeping account,” granting credit, so to speak, in semantic
disputes).
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default, as ultimate arbiters of what the law really means.125 What
matters in the development of international law by way of interpretation
is the semantic authority of particular actors, above all international
courts.126 The notion of semantic authority refers to an actor’s capacity
to influence and shape meanings, as well as the ability to establish their
communications as authoritative reference points in legal discourse. In
fact, the interpretations of international courts usually carry weight in
the communicative practice of international law and therefore have also
significant potential to bear heavily on its development.
IV. THE SEMANTIC AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
Part IV.A elucidates the spell of precedents in judicial practice as
one of the main factors sustaining international courts’ semantic
authority, transcending any distinction between their roles as developers
or interpreters of the law. Part IV.B then turns to the normative
implications that follow from international courts’ authority in the
making of the law.
A. The Spell of Precedents
International courts enjoy an outstanding position in semantic
struggles about the meaning of law.127 With concrete case decisions and
reasoning that supports their findings, international courts exercise a
great deal of authority over the legal discourse. Quite a few judgments
even appear to be geared towards providing authoritative reference
points for future discourse, making general and abstract formulations
that may not even be compelled by the case.128 A combination of
sociological predispositions, as well as the law itself, sustains courts’
semantic authority. In case of dispute, the law points to them for
resolution. In Bourdieu’s words,

125. Such recognition is nothing natural or necessary and it may indeed shift. The histories of
many legal systems show this.
126. VENZKE, HOW INTERPRETATION MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15, at 57–
64.
127. Cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (submitting
generally and too drastically that judges are murderers because they kill alternative meanings).
128. Stephan Schill, System-Building in Investment Arbitration and Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN
L.J. 1083 (2011) (discussing authority exercised by investment treaty tribunals); see Ingo Venzke,
Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing Article XX GATT into
Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1111 (2011) (discussing authority
exercised by adjudicating bodies in trade law).
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[t]he judgment represents the quintessential form of authorized,
public, official speech . . . magical acts which succeed because they
have the power to make themselves universally recognized. They
thus succeed in creating a situation in which no one can refuse or
129
ignore the point of view, the vision, which they impose.

If one considers the mighty spell of precedents in the practice of
international law, then success of international decisions appears less
magical but more in line with participants’ normative expectations.130
International courts enjoy semantic authority above all because of the
working of precedents.
International legal doctrine strikes a different tone. It is trite and
commonplace that international law knows no stare decisis rule, that
judgments are binding only inter partes,131 and that Article 38(1)(d) of
the ICJ Statute mentions judicial decisions only as subsidiary means of
interpretation, as a Rechtserkenntnisquelle (source for recognizing the
law) and not a Rechtsquelle (a source of law).132 While it is not bare of
all merit, this distinction in doctrine does overshadow the actual
working of precedents. Judges frequently relate their argument to earlier
decisions, thus boosting the authority of past, present, and future
decisions. This practice responds to international courts’ aspiration to
portray their practice as objective and rule-bound and it responds to all
actors’ expectations. Notably, such expectations persist regardless of
whether participants have stronger civil- or common-law backgrounds.
In many judgments, precedent amounts to influential arguments,
and actors in legal interpretation fight about the meaning of previous
decisions just like they do about the meaning of instruments that come
under the heading of sources. In most practical circumstances,
interpreters cannot escape the discussion of case law. Judicial decisions
significantly redistribute argumentative burdens and courts are expected
to decide consistently or, if they deviate from precious jurisprudence, to
give reasons why they do so.133 There is both a force as a matter of fact,

129. Bourdieu, supra note 35, at 838.
130. See Marc Jacob, Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication, 12
GERMAN L.J. 1005, 1015 (2011) (further making the salient point that, while the working of
precedents accounts in large part for the authority of international courts, they also constrain the
later interpretative practice, including that of the courts themselves).
131. Rudolf Bernhardt, Article 59, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE, A COMMENTARY 1231, 1232 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2006).
132. See Pellet, supra note 45, at 677.
133. Abi-Saab, supra note 6, at 19, 25; ALAN E. BOYLE & CHRISTINE M. CHINKIN, THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (2007).
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as well as an attitude that interpretation should relate to relevant earlier
decisions.
For a long time, courts have continuously stressed the significance
of precedents and have contributed to their power. In its Mavrommatis
case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) found that it
had “no reason to depart from a construction which clearly flows from
the previous judgments the reasoning of which it still regards as
sound.”134 In his thorough analysis of the PCIJ, Ole Spiermann shows
that the court portrayed an increasing inclination to actively engage in
international lawmaking, and that the working of precedent was crucial
in this endeavor.135 In 1958, Hersch Lauterpacht also found that “the
practice of referring to its previous decisions has become one of the
most conspicuous features of the Judgments and Opinions of the
Court.”136 Certainly, the use and influence of precedents is not a new
phenomenon, but it has lately gained increasing magnitude, together
with the establishment of new institutions and increasing frequency of
international adjudication.137
Adjudication in the WTO context offers persuasive examples. In
one of its first cases, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the AB relied on
Article 3.2 of the DSU, which provides that “[t]he dispute settlement of
the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to
the multilateral trading system,” to argue that its reports “create
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should
be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.”138 In a
renewed appeal on the issue of zeroing, a measure to calculate antidumping duties, the AB recalled that WTO Members have repeatedly
stressed “the importance of consistency and stability” in
interpretation.139 The AB then continued to emphasize that its findings
134. Readaptation of the Mavrommatic Jerusalem Concessions, Jurisdictions, 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 11, at 18 (Oct. 10); cf. MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD
COURT 16–29 (1996); Jacob, supra note 130, at 1015.
135. OLE SPIERMANN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT IN THE PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: THE RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY 394 (2005).
136. LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 9.
137. Cf. Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the
Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 EUR. J. INT’L 73 (2009); Armin von Bogdandy
& Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of International Courts’ Public Authority and
its Democratic Justification, in 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2012) [hereinafter Bogdandy & Venzke,
In Whose Name?].
138. Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 14; see also Zeroing in
Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea, ¶ 7.6, WT/DS402/R (Jan. 18, 2011).
139. Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless
Steel from Mexico, ¶ 161, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008).
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are clarifications of the law and, as such, are not limited to the specific
case.140 Finally, it attacked the Anti-Dumping Panel for failing to follow
its earlier reports, stating: “We are deeply concerned about the Panel’s
decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence
clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues. The Panel’s
approach has serious implications for the proper functioning of the
WTO dispute settlement system . . .”.141
The European Communities had joined the proceedings as a third
party and attempted to push the argument even further, suggesting that
the Panel would fail to conduct an “objective assessment” of the matter
before it, in connection with its claim under Article 11 of the DSU, if it
did not follow the AB’s precedent.142 Although the AB itself did not go
that far, it created a lingering threat by suggesting that disregard for its
precedent might actually amount to a failure of exercising a proper
judicial function.143
The weight that the AB explicitly attaches to its previous reports
almost makes a mockery out of the view that reports have no legal
effects beyond the parties to the dispute. Relevant actors have come to
recognize the systemic impact of adjudication onto trade law in general.
In the discussion of one of the first AB reports in the DSB, the Brazilian
representative stated:
It was well-known that in practice any decision of a panel or the
Appellate Body with regard to a specific case would go beyond such
a specific case. Although no binding precedents had been created,
the findings and conclusions of panels and the Appellate Body
adopted by the DSB had created expectations concerning future
interpretations of the DSU and the WTO Agreement. Therefore, in
light of these systemic implications of decisions and
recommendations pertaining to a specific case, Brazil wished to state
144
its position with regard to certain findings of the Appellate Body.

The powerful working of precedent fuelling international courts’
semantic authority in legal discourse is particularly strong in the WTO,
140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 162. See also Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶¶ 362–65, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) [hereinafter
Zeroing Methodology Appellate Body Report].
142. Anti-Dumping Appellate Body Report, supra note 139, ¶ 51.
143. Id. ¶ 161. See also Zeroing Methodology Appellate Body Report, supra note 141, ¶ 362.
144. Minutes of Meeting, Dispute Settlement Body, WT/DSB/M/50 (Nov. 6, 1998),
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/DSB/M50.doc (the meeting
concerned the adoption of the Appellate Body Report in US – Shrimp).
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not least due to the dynamics associated with a system of appellate
review.145 However, this authority is not a phenomenon of such a
context alone. The field of international investment arbitration could
comparatively be a hard case because of its decentralized and slightly
disparate institutional and legal structure. It is true that investment
tribunals have largely played it safe, suggesting that they can find
“inspiration” in earlier decisions of other courts and tribunals.146 Yet the
authority of precedent is remarkable when it is used as shorthand for
what the law is. References to earlier decisions have in fact been used as
substitutes for a tribunal’s own reasoning.147 It is also noteworthy that
the tribunal in Saipem v. Bangladesh recognized that it might not only
seek inspiration from earlier decisions as it pleases, but that it must pay
due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals.148 The
tribunal believed that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it had a
duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases.149 It
also believed that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the
circumstances of the actual case, it had a duty to seek to contribute to
the harmonious development of investment law, and thereby to meet the
legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors
towards certainty of the rule of law.150
This seems all the more true and pertinent when, as the Tribunal in
El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic put
145. Cf. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 92–115 (Mar. 24,
2000); Prosecutor v. Kupreckic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 540 (Jan. 14, 2000) (showing
this is similar in the institutional setting of international criminal law, even if jurisprudence is
slightly less clear in this regard).
146. See, e.g., AES Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 31–32 (Apr. 26, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 308 (2005); Romak S.A. v. Uzbekistan,
UNCITRAL, Case No. AA280, Award, ¶ 170 (Nov. 26, 2009) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009); Chevron
Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, Partial Award on the Merits, ¶ 164 (Mar. 30, 2010);
Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 391 (July 14, 2006).
147. Schill, supra note 128, at 131 n.88.
148. Saipem S.P.A. v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Provisional Measures, ¶ 67 (Mar. 21, 2007).
149. Id.
150. Id. See also Schill, supra note 128, at 1154–55 (pointing out the virtually identical
reiterations of this statement in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & Vivendi
Universal S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶ 189 (July 30,
2010)); Noble Energy, Inc. & Machalapower CIA. LTDA v. Ecuador & Consejo Nacional de
Electricidad, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 50 (Mar. 5, 2008); cf.
Catherine Kessedjian, To Give or Not to Give Precedential Value to Investment Arbitration
Awards?, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 43, 43–44 (Catherine A. Rogers &
Roger P. Alford eds., 2009) (arguing that the use of certain legal terms has blurred the field of
investment law).
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it, “parties, in their written pleadings and oral arguments, have heavily
relied on precedent.”151 Parties’ pleadings are usually not accessible, but
it can safely be assumed that counsels usually unfold their argument
with supporting precedent.
In the practice of adjudication, international courts exercise
semantic authority and thereby contribute to the making of international
law. One of the main mechanisms that fosters their position in the
international legal discourse is the working of precedent that
redistributes argumentative burdens, shapes the normative expectations
of all actors involved, and thus serves as a vehicle that drives
international courts’ role as interpreters and developers of the law, or,
more clearly, as lawmakers. This understanding of their practice then
places the emphasis on international courts’ exercise of authority and
ultimately challenges prevailing narratives of legitimation. Which
normative implications follow from international courts semantic
authority?
B. Normative Implications
The semantic authority that international courts exercise in the
practice of adjudication challenges the narrative of legitimacy that is
embedded in the traditional view, which sees international decisions as
flowing from the consent of the subjects they address. International
courts tend to keep with this script even at great stretch.152 When this
stretch becomes all too difficult, functional considerations frequently
step in to help and to complement the justificatory basis of consent.153
Viewed from this angle, international decisions are justified by way of
functional accounts in the sense that adjudication is taken to promote
values, goals or community interests, and above all, international
peace.154 The institutional design of some international judicial

151. El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 39 (Apr. 27, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 488 (2006).
152. Cf. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
Judgment, ¶ 66 (July 13, 2009) (“where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, [they]must
be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an evolving meaning”);
Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 396, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec.
21, 2009).
153. Karin Oellers-Frahm, Nowhere to Go? The Obligation to Settle Disputes Peacefully in
the Absence of Compulsory Jurisdiction, in A WISER CENTURY? 435, 439–40 (Thomas Giegerich
ed., 2009).
154. Id. at 440.
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institutions does, at least in part, support this view.155 The international
criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court are, for example,
supposed to also gain legitimacy by way of ending impunity for
international crimes.156 Such functional narratives appear to be a little
weaker with regard to the WTO and arbitration in investment disputes,
but it is also possible to find legitimation in these fields by means of the
goals of increased economic welfare or economic development.157
There are a number of situations in which these sources of
legitimacy might carry the justification of an international court’s
authority quite far. But in light of the growing autonomy of some
courts, as well as in view of the breadth of controversial fields in which
international courts are involved, there are now also many constellations
in which neither the original consent nor the functional goal can any
longer convincingly settle legitimatory concerns. International courts’
function of successfully settling disputes in the service of peace
certainly remains most relevant, not least for the promotion of
democratic governance, which, after all, flourishes better in a peaceful
world.158
And yet, like other justifications that hinge on the goals to be
pursued, this theory misses large chunks of the scope of international
judicial practice and ignores other principled considerations that speak
against placing too much weight on functional legitimacy. “[A]s
important as a certain goal may be, it cannot fully settle the justification
of public authority. The aim cannot offer sufficient basis for concrete
decisions that inevitably entail critical normative questions and
redistributions of power. Moreover, functional arguments offer no

155. See Romano, supra note 27, at 794–95.
156. Antonio Cassese, The Rationale for International Criminal Justice, in OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 127 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009).
157. Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the
Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 221
(2006); Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 149
(2008); Thomas W. Wälde, The Umbrella Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on
Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 183, 185–86 (2005) (analyzing
the relationship between economic growth and the honoring of contracts).
158. Apart from this, international courts can, for instance, foster democratization through a
democracy oriented human rights jurisprudence. See Matthews v. United Kingdom, 28 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 361, 361 (1999) (finding that absence of elections in Gibraltar to the European Parliament
violated right to participate in elections). Cf. Georg Ress, Das Europäische Parlament als
Gesetzgeber: Der Blickpunkt der EMRK, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPARECHTLICHE STUDIEN
219, 226 (1999); Jenny Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV.
429, 461 (2003) (suggesting that this is the main function of international jurisdiction).
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solution for the unavoidable competition between different goals.”159 It
may sometimes be true that international adjudication achieves what
everyone wants and yet fails to deliver.160 Yet even those may be lucky
hits. History cautions that too much confidence should not be placed
even on the benevolent and enlightened ruler, not even if they are
judges.
Considerations of democratic legitimation remain the gold
standard against which any kind of public authority ultimately needs to
be assessed, including international public authority.161 Under this basic
premise it is possible to sketch a number of strategies that may help
justify the authority international courts exercise by way of their legal
interpretations. Such strategies first of all include elements of the
procedural law of international judicial institutions, particularly rules
pertaining to transparency, third-party participation, and the openness
towards amici curiae.162 Reconsidering mechanisms in the election of
judges may also help. Developments geared towards improving the
politico-legislative process, both within the particular regimes in which
international courts are embedded, as well as within the international
legal order more generally, may further respond to legitimatory
concerns that spring from the authority that international courts exercise
in the practice of adjudication. Such strategies harbor a legitimating
potential that is slowly set free, even if their concrete effects need to be
tested on an empirical basis and in view of a number of possible
downsides and alternatives. Notably, quite a few suggestions are met
halfway by recent trends in practice, driven above all by courts
themselves. Trends towards greater transparency and improved avenues
for participation, for example, are indicative of a deeper change in the
thinking about judicial interpretation, which increasingly recognize and
come to terms with the role of international courts in lawmaking.
159. Bogdandy & Venzke, Democratic Legitimation, supra note 39, at 1342. On the concept
of international public authority, see generally Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann & Matthias
Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal
Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1375 (2008).
160. Robert Howse & Susan Esserman, The Appellate Body, the WTO Dispute Settlement
System and the Politics of Multilateralism, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 61 (Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., 2006)
(convincingly pointing to a number of instances in which adjudication in the WTO overcame
deadlocks in processes of political negotiation).
161. Bogdandy & Venzke, In Whose Name?, supra note 137, at 29.
162. Ingo Venzke, Antinomies and Change in International Dispute Settlement: An Exercise
in Comparative Procedural Law, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ROOM FOR
INNOVATIONS (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Ina Gätzschmann eds., forthcoming).
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V. PROGNOSIS
Working out the jurisgenerative practice of adjudication in
international law and drawing attention to the role international courts
play in semantic struggles about what the law means challenge orthodox
narratives about the legitimation of their practice. There is much room
for exploring the precise parameters of legitimation and the different
strategies that may respond to this challenge. As part thereof, and going
beyond such efforts, there are two concrete tasks that may be
particularly salient. The first would be a plain sociological endeavor. If
international courts are indeed significant actors who exercise public
authority, then it would simply be helpful to know more about those
actors, both as institutions and in their personal composition. Both
professional as well as cultural preferences—elements that sustain a
vision of the world and of (international) law more generally—are very
powerful factors in processes of communicative lawmaking. Who are
the rulers? While such studies are far advanced in many domestic legal
systems, the international judge has more successfully escaped closer
scrutiny, even if international legal scholarship is catching up.163
The second task would be more straightforwardly normative. It
relates to political theory as well as an assignment for legal doctrine.
Responses to problems regarding the justification of international
courts’ authority will ultimately have to extend to considerations
regarding the allocation of authority in a multilevel system of
governance.164 In this context, it happens that actors on competing levels
of governance can offer good reasons, also under basic premises of
democratic legitimation, for why their claims to legality should prevail.
The AB may, for example, give voice to an international bargain and
find that the European import prohibition of hormone-treated beef is
illegal under trade law. The European polity may still find that it really
does not like hormone-treated beef and continue to live in breach of its
international obligations while respecting the wishes of European
163. See, e.g., DANIEL TERRIS, CESARE P.R. ROMANO & LEIGH SWIGART, THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S
CASES 15–48 (2007) (discussing international judges, including how they are selected); Ruth
Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, Judicial Selections For International Courts: Towards Common
Principles and Practices, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 213, 214 (Kate Malleson & Petter Russel eds., 2006).
164. Bogdandy & Venzke, Democratic Legitimation, supra note 39, 1368–69; NICO KRISCH,
BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW 13, 273–
75 (2010) (“legitimacy questions have to be framed for the entirety of the order, not just for one
(domestic or international) part of it”).
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citizens. There is competition between levels of governance and
between legal orders. No single actor has the ultimate say on how to
treat the issue.165 Also, in terms of political theory, it is difficult if not
impossible to find sufficient hold in order to settle the issue.166 It would
thus be well advised and critical to further develop ideas about
legitimate public authority in a system of multilevel governance in
which actors accommodate and contest international courts’ practice
and where international courts stay attuned to competing spheres of
authority. While international and domestic courts will be the main
actors governing the borders between levels of governance, legal
doctrine could help in shaping the vocabulary for their interaction. A
critical place of work would be a refined understanding of standards of
review that reflects their functioning on the lines of legal orders,
allocating authority in a normative pluriverse.

165. See in detail id. at 273–75. See also JANNE E. NIJMAN & ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 341, 350 (Janne
E. Nijman & André Nollkaemper eds., 2007).
166. Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty: The Global
Vocation of Political Ethics, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 163, 164 (Tomer Broude &
Yuval Shany eds., 2008); Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the
Relationship between Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD?
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 258 (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (offering a hermeneutic framework for looking at actual
negotiations regarding the allocation of authority).

